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Abstract 
Purpose: This research is intended to inform a knowledge gap in the literature and present the first 
national findings related to intelligence-led policing adoption among state and local agencies. Specific 
practices are identified to inform scholars and practitioners regarding intelligence-led policing behaviors.  
Methods: Original survey research from a federally-funded project is gleaned to explore intelligence-led 
policing adoption through a loose-coupling theoretical perspective. Negative binomial and logistic 
regression models are employed to identify predictive relationships.   
Results: Agencies nationwide appear to be closely following the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan recommendations to enhance information sharing.  Consistent with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Target Capabilities List is also observed. Agency size appears to have a significant effect on 
key organizational information sharing behaviors.  The findings are tempered due to limitations in the 
research design.  
Conclusions: Local agencies appear to be tightly-coupled with the recommendations put forth in the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan in their efforts to adopt intelligence-led policing. Agency size 
appears to enhance adoption across most dependent metrics. This research progresses the limited evidence 
base and progress regarding this emerging policing philosophy.  
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Highlights: 
• National data of local law enforcement agencies is utilized.
• Local agencies appear to be closely following federal recommendations for ILP.
• Agencies appear to model their ILP capacity after the DHS target capabilities list.
• Larger agencies have more relationships with organizations and create more products.
• Training specific to ILP enhances the likelihood of adoption.
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Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: An Application of Loose-Coupling Theory 
 
Introduction 
 In the 1970s, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment exposed the limitations of 
the patrol as an effective method for the police to deal with crime.  Since then, police agencies in 
the United States experimented with several different programs and philosophies intended to 
improve their effectiveness.  In particular, team policing, community policing, problem oriented 
policing, and Compstat were intended to reduce the police reliance on patrol and responding to 
calls for service (Phillips, 2012).  Each of these innovations expected law enforcement to 
approach crime reduction through analysis, using the public in a supportive and collaborative 
role.  This new vista on crime fighting would require a substantive shift in thinking and behavior 
if the police were to be more effective in reducing and solving crime.  Empirical evidence 
suggests, however, that the features of team policing, community policing, problem oriented 
policing, and Compstat were not properly implemented (see Dabney, 2010; Eck & Spelman, 
1993; Maguire, 1997; Sherman et al., 1973).   
 It has been argued that programs are enacted but often encounter problems at the 
implementation stage (Pressman & Waldavsky, 1984).  Implementation is frequently a complex 
process because there are often several layers to negotiate (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980).  For 
example, organizations may have several different levels and communications channels, 
complicating the implementation process.  Williams (1982), in his research on legislation, argued 
that at least three levels are involved in the implementation process.  The executive-level 
develops the law, the agency-level applies the law, and the street-level enforces, or implements 
the law.  The gap between the layers often results in disagreement among the actors at the 
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various levels, regarding the goal of their particular behavior in relation to the law or program.  
Feeley (1983) describe this as a “leakage of authority.”   For example, when legislatures enacted 
“mandatory arrest” laws to address domestic violence, the goal at the executive-level was to 
deter future offenses by making arrest easier for police officers.  The goal of street-level officers, 
however, was not necessarily deterrence.  Their focus was to immediately resolve the situation, 
unlike executives that were procuring a deterrence effect (Phillips, 2008). 
 This research fills a gap in understanding organizational implementation, by studying the 
use of intelligence-led policing (ILP);  a recently developed approach intended to improve police 
effectiveness through information sharing and data analysis (Carter & Carter 
2009a).  Implementing ILP requires police agencies to shift away from the traditional practices 
of routine patrol and responding to calls for service (Ratcliffe, 2008).  This study is grounded 
within a loose coupling theoretical framework, which argues there is a gap between what an 
organization is expected to do and what is actually being done (Hallet, 2010).  The 
implementation of ILP is examined by identifying aspects representative of police agency 
behavior that may contribute to the connection, or disconnection, between what police are 
expected to do and what is actually being done with respect to ILP.  From a practical perspective, 
if there are common factors that hinder or enhance the implementation of ILP, police agencies 
may possibly improve their efforts to utilize this emerging approach.  With respect to research, 
scholars seeking to advance the knowledge base of contemporary policing and intelligence will 
have an exploratory evidence base to inform their designs.   
 
 
 
5 
 
Loose Coupling Theory   
 In the 1970s, Meyer and Rowan (1977) developed institutional theory (also known as 
neo-institutionalism) to examine the behavior of organizations.  These scholars reported that 
organizations prescribe to symbolic myths and ceremonies in order to achieve field legitimacy.  
With field legitimacy, organizations receive resources, thereby procuring a level of stability in 
the occupational field (Crank & Langworthy, 1992).  The cognitive methods to field acceptance 
are anchored in isomorphism or homogeneous practices.  As DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 
149) claimed isomorphism is a method “that forces one” organization into “the same set of 
environment conditions” as others within field.  The three forms of isomorphism are coercive, 
mimetic and normative.  Coercive isomorphism is institutional practices that are imposed by 
regulatory bodies (e.g. government).  Mimetic are successful practices that are copied “from one 
another,” while normative isomorphism are directives from professionals that align 
organizational practices (Deflem, 2008, p. 150).  Loose coupling occurs when prescribed 
organizational practices are not followed because of internal organizational contingencies 
(Edelman, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).   
  Loose coupling theory suggests that organizations are split into two levels, allowing them 
to behave rationally at one level while responding to uncertainty at another (Thompson, 1967).  
These groups are the superordinate or dominant coalition, and the subordinate or work process 
group (Ingersoll, 1993; Weick, 1969, 1976, 1982).  The former contain leaders or supervisors 
within an organization that are charged with maintaining institutional legitimacy (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  The superordinate level preserves legitimacy by developing institutional policies 
and practices that signal to the external environment they are aligned with field performance.  
That is, the superordinate level performs in a way satisfying the expectations of the external 
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environment.  The external environment includes political counterparts, groups who can apply 
pressure on an agency, and the media.  The subordinate or work process group is comprised of 
institutional actors (e.g. street-level workers) that are expected to follow the dominant coalition’s 
prescription for the agency.  These workers, however, exist in an environment where their 
behavior may require modifications from what is expected.  Thus, institutional actors retain a 
level of independence in how they perform their duties.  In short, the dominant coalition 
prescribes or enacts institutional practices, while the work process group is expected to subscribe 
to or implement those desired practices.  The fact that the superordinate and subordinate levels 
are linked is found in the word “coupled,” while the fact these elements have a degree of 
independence from each other is found by the word “loosely” (Orton & Weick, 1990). 
 Loose coupling is a suitable theory to predict or explain the gap between the 
administrative and street-level layers of an organization (Feeley, 1983; Williams, 1982).  Loose 
coupling suggests that both groups do not always work in tandem (Weick, 1969, 1976, 1982; 
Ingersoll, 1993).  The disconnection or “slippage” between the desired outcomes by the 
dominant coalition and the actual practice by the work process group is grounded in the reality of 
the organization or profession (Lipsky, 1980).  As Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas (2003) might 
posit, the discretion of street-level workers cannot be fully accounted for.  Specifically, engaging 
diverse populations requires flexibility in street-level authority in order to adhere to public needs 
(Stojkovic, et al., 2003).      
 
Loose Coupling and Policing 
 Loose coupling theory has been a developing area of policing scholarship.  Central to 
policing and loose coupling research are observations on organization size; specifically, 
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disconnect between the desires of the dominant coalition and practices of the work process 
group.  Policing scholarship suggests this slippage between both groups directly corresponds to 
agency size.  Mastrofski and his colleagues (1987) reported that administrators for large 
organizations do not closely monitor officers, as that they tend to be more concerned with 
appeasing the external environment.  This, then, provides officers in large agencies a greater 
degree of discretion when compared to their counterparts in smaller agencies.  Mastrofski et al. 
(1987) supported their claim by reporting that officers in smaller agencies were likely to arrest 
all drunk-driving offenders, while officers in larger agencies would arrest 50% to 60% of 
violators.    
 Other scholars contend there are additional considerations beyond agency size that 
explain the loose coupling between the dominant coalition and work process group in police 
organizations.  Brown (1981) found that officers in smaller agencies in California exercised more 
discretion than officers in larger agencies, such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).  
Brown (1981) suggested that small agencies, given their high-visibility, would need to exercise 
discretion to minimize public concerns.  Phillips’ (2008) research on domestic violence and 
mandatory arrests reported that agency size was not correlated to police practices.  Rather, the 
likelihood of arrests in domestic violence incidents is best explained by the situational variables 
in a domestic violence incident (i.e., victim injury, the existence of an order of protection, and 
the cooperation of the offender) (Phillips, 2008).   
 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) 
 For the past decade, American law enforcement has faced implementation and 
operational challenges of adopting an emerging policing philosophy known as ILP (Carter & 
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Carter, 2009a; Crank et al., 2010; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013).  This ambiguity and 
implementation fidelity mirrors the law enforcement experience with community policing 
throughout the past 30 years.  This new philosophy has been widely accepted with little 
exploration.  Anecdotal evidence suggests four important factors for this occurring.  First, after 
September 11, 2001, there was a strong desire on behalf of state and local agencies to “do 
something” in order to prevent a similar attack from occurring again.  Second, there was a 
strong, unified message from police leaders and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Global 
Intelligence Working Group that it was necessary to implement ILP to protect communities 
consistent with national standards.  Third, in the years since September 11, 2001, agencies saw 
what they believed to be success in combating crime beyond terrorism by utilizing the 
intelligence-led approach (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2010).  Lastly, the application of ILP is 
believed to be an effective approach to target and reduce violent crime in urban areas (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2010).     
Similar to the evolution of community policing, ILP seeks to reform existing police 
practices to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of existing processes.  While community 
policing largely relied on a re-shaping of existing resources, ILP requires some additional 
resources in the form of an analytic capability.  This capability can be created within an agency 
by hiring an intelligence analyst or by relying upon the analytic capability of fusion centers that 
are designed to support and facilitate information sharing for law enforcement (Carter and 
Carter, 2009b).  Despite this integrated analytic function, ILP mirrors the transformation towards 
community policing wherein agencies were not expected to overhaul their organization.  ILP is 
built upon best practices established by community policing while emphasizing an integrated 
information, or evidence-based, decision making to help inform strategic resource allocations or 
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inform patrol officers of emerging trends and tactics in jurisdictional crime.  When summarizing 
the change experienced by police agencies with regard to ILP, Wood and Shearing (2007, p. 55) 
explained “[ILP] does not re-imagine the police role so much as it re-imagines how the police 
can be smarter in the application of their unique authority and capacities.”   
Ratcliffe (2008) describes ILP as a comprehensive adjustment of organizational functions 
that align tasks and operations with intelligence and analytic capabilities.  In addition, he notes 
several specific areas where police agencies engaged in ILP will divert from practices typically 
found within law enforcement’s purview.  To begin with, personnel – specifically those 
personnel who are responsible for the intelligence function within their agency – must be 
formally trained to comprehend the function of intelligence and information sharing.  Next, there 
must be regular channels to communicate intelligence to personnel making decisions.  These 
strategic and tactical decisions should be driven by intelligence products that result from a formal 
analytic process.  These products should be diverse to best inform the range of complex activities 
law enforcement is responsible for delivering.  Lastly, there must be changes to organizational 
structure and accountability to ensure intelligence-related functions are resourced and a priority 
to the agency (Carter & Carter, 2009a; Ratcliffe, 2008).   
Beyond the aforementioned internal organizational changes, scholars contend that ILP (as 
practiced in the United States vs the United Kingdom) should employ community policing 
principles (Carter & Carter, 2009a; Chappell & Gibson, 2009; Innes, 2006).  Perhaps the key 
component gleaned from community policing is the emphasis on two-way information sharing 
with the public.  Such an approach should not be limited to relationships between police and the 
communities they serve, but also among law enforcement agencies themselves.  As a result of 
the highly fragmented structure of American law enforcement, many geographic areas contain 
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multiple police authority jurisdictions – such as county sheriff, different municipalities, state 
police, and possible township or university police as well.  Despite sharing the same geographic 
proximity, anecdotal evidence suggests these agencies rarely communicated relevant information 
across one another (Carter, 2009).  In wake of the communication failures leading up to 
September 11, 2001, the need for law enforcement to develop cooperative relationships with 
agencies within and outside of their own jurisdiction has been paramount.  These relationships 
should be reciprocal in nature where agencies proactively and reactively share information.  
Exploratory research in this area indicates such relationships exist, but are being under-utilized 
for enhancing information sharing (Carter, 2014).    
The difficulty associated with implementing ILP has been a lack of specific guidance.  
More often than not, general guides or standards are disseminated by the federal government to 
communicate an initiative.  These documents call for the law enforcement community to do 
something, but provide little tangible guidance.  One such example of this is the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Target Capabilities List (TCL) that identifies and emphasizes the role of 
intelligence and information sharing for local law enforcement beyond a focus that has 
predominantly been terrorism-centric.  The TCL “provides a guide for developing a national 
network of capabilities that will be available when and where they are needed to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from major events” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2007, p.5).  While certainly important to the greater intelligence landscape, the TCL is difficult 
for the average municipal agency in the U.S. to translate into practice.  
To date, there have been two predominant sources of information for law enforcement to 
reference when adopting an intelligence-led approach into the daily operations of their 
department.  First, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) was published in 
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coordination with the Global Intelligence Working Group and the U.S. Department of Justice.  
These entities represent the federal perspective of ILP, as it should be practiced by state and local 
agencies.  From a loose coupling perspective, the NCISP represents the characteristics to which 
state and local law enforcement should adhere to, for successful ILP.  Second, a comprehensive 
guide was funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and written 
by David L. Carter (2009).  The perspectives of this guide are largely consistent with the 
recommendations put forth by the NCISP.  This COPS guide has been widely utilized by law 
enforcement practitioners and serves as a comprehensive source for a range of law enforcement 
intelligence topics.  Beyond simply information sharing and ILP, this guide examines civil rights 
and privacy, public-private partnerships, fusion centers, suspicious activity, and open source 
information.  This research utilizes the NCISP as representative of the coupling framework 
between federal government and state and local law enforcement.  The authors came to this 
conclusion for two reasons.  The NCISP is written and published directly from the federal 
government and Carter’s (2009) guide is largely based on the recommendations put forth by the 
NCISP.   
 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
In March 2002, law enforcement executives from across the country gathered at the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit to 
articulate a proposal for an intelligence sharing plan that aligned with then-President Bush’s 
homeland security initiative.  Participants of this summit envisioned law enforcement agencies at 
all levels of government engaging to coordinate, collect, analyze, and appropriately disseminate 
criminal intelligence across the United States (The Police Chief, 2003).  Consistent with the 
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American experience of community policing, ILP is an evolving concept (Ratcliffe, 2008; 
Schaible & Sheffield, 2013) that is unique to each agency (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  To date, 
state and local law enforcement have relied upon the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP) as a guiding policy through which ILP is intended to operate in the United States.  
Though the NCISP is the foundation for ILP, it is important to note that the two are not 
synonymous.  The NCISP provides a framework through which ILP can be operationally applied 
to law enforcement agencies (Carter & Carter, 2009a).  It is a recommendation guide-post and 
source of standards to which law enforcement should map their intelligence functions.  
The NCISP serves as a tool through which state and local law enforcement can translate 
the greater notion of “law enforcement intelligence” into an operational and strategic program of 
practice.  This greater notion of law enforcement intelligence is, in its most simple form, a 
general term that applies to the philosophy and apparatus of information sharing strictly among 
law enforcement (primarily state, local, and tribal) organizations (Carter, 2009).  This general 
term also signifies the contrast of intelligence as it applies to local law enforcement versus 
national security organizations.  A discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of the 
current research; it is sufficient to say stark differences exist between law enforcement 
intelligence and national security intelligence with regard to strategic focus, objectives, and 
legalities.   
 
Current Research  
 At present, the literature suffers from a lack of empirical research within the area of law 
enforcement intelligence and information sharing.  This shortcoming is a result of unwillingness 
on behalf of law enforcement agencies to provide to researchers data and information pertaining 
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to sensitive operations such as intelligence.  Moreover, there has been a lack of appropriate 
theory application to examine intelligence-led policing.  The present research seeks to inform 
these shortcomings by utilizing loose coupling theory and data from a national sample of law 
enforcement agencies and their intelligence practices.  From the outset it is important to 
acknowledge that the present research has limited generalizability due to a small sample of 
agencies relative to the number of agencies nationwide.  Despite this limitation to external 
validity, the constructs examined to explore intelligence practices and loose coupling theory 
within the sample agencies are uniquely valid to the greater research question and literature 
given the intelligence-specific nature of the survey items and respondents’ knowledge.  Further 
detail regarding the survey and study methodology will be discussed in the section to follow.  
Loose coupling theory posits that a dominant coalition will develop and influence a 
desired change.  The dominant coalition in this study is the U.S. Department of Justice, for 
several reasons. First, the USDOJ published the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP), which recommends all police agencies develop their intelligence capability (Global 
Intelligence Working Group, 2003).  Second, in 2002, the COPS Office funded an “Intelligence 
Summit,” which was hosted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  “At this 
summit, law enforcement professionals expressed frustration in the lack of guidance from the 
government as to how intelligence-led policing should be defined and put into practice” (Carter 
& Phillips, 2013, p. 3).  These features of the USDOJ fit within the dominant coalition’s duties to 
develop policies to achieve goals (Stojkovic, et al., 2003).  Individual police agencies will be 
considered the work process group. Police agencies are expected to implement the 
recommendations of the dominant coalition; thus local police agencies are expected to 
implement operational aspects of ILP.   
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 This research examines several dependent measures that indicate an active ILP approach 
in policing.  Regression analyses are employed to examine the predictive impact of several 
independent variables on the implementation of ILP.  Because this study frames loose coupling 
differently than past studies (i.e., inter-organizational vs. intra-organizational), it is difficult to 
articulate specific hypothesize.  For example, others found loose coupling within larger police 
agencies (Mastrofski, et al., 1987).  It might be expected here, however, that larger police 
agencies would be tightly coupled with the dominant coalition because larger agencies had 
access to knowledge and resources to adequately implement aspects of ILP.  Further discussion 
of the findings as applied to theory and practice are presented.  
 
Measures 
Data 
Data were gleaned from a larger project funded by the National Institute of Justice1 
which conducted a national survey of law enforcement intelligence practices of different key 
personnel.  This purposive sample of law enforcement personnel included individuals who had 
attended a national training program funded by the Department of Homeland Security.  This 
sampling strategy was primarily chosen for multiple reasons.  By attending this training, these 
personnel were identified by their respective agency as a representative of the intelligence 
function within the agency.  These persons are most likely to be the personnel who have direct 
knowledge and a working understanding of key issues related to intelligence and information 
sharing – thus they are most knowledgeable about the practices of interest. This approach has 
been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel when examining issues such as 
police assigned to cybercrime (Bossler & Holt, 2012) and policing sex workers (Simic et al., 
                                                 
1 Grant number 2008-IJ-CX-0007. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. 
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2006).  Empirical research exploring law enforcement intelligence issues has been severely 
hampered by a lack of access to, and unwillingness to participate by, intelligence personnel 
within agencies (see Chermak et al. 2013).  Moreover, ideal surveying methods – such as 
random sampling – are not feasible given the fidelity of intelligence practices nationwide.  Not 
every law enforcement agency in the country is actively engaged in information sharing and 
intelligence practices (Carter & Phillips 2013), thus a targeted sample is required.   
 
Survey of Key Personnel 
The survey was administered using a web-based software program and training 
participants’ email addresses.  A single individual working within the intelligence function 
responded to the survey on behalf of the agency.  Throughout the sampling process, the sampling 
frame was corrected by removing individuals who could not be contacted or who declined to 
participate.  Invitation e-mails were sent to a sample of 967 agencies to participate in the study.  
A total of 272 state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are included in the sample.  The 
response rate for the present study is 28% (n= 272 / 967).  Such a response rate is not surprising, 
given online-based surveys yield lower response rates than traditional mail or in-person surveys 
(Shih & Fan, 2009), that cross-sectional response rates in social sciences are declining (Brick & 
Williams, 2013), and the exploratory nature of the research within an area of law enforcement 
commonly believed to be a difficult one to sample (Chermak et al., 2013).  Despite the less than 
ideal response rate, the sample includes agencies from small, medium, and large municipalities, 
county sheriffs, and state police.  Moreover, 41 states (including the District of Columbia) with 
geographic distribution across the five regions of the U.S. are represented in the sample.   
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To explore why the response rate was not higher, follow-up telephone interviews were 
conducted with 100 randomly selected participants from the sample.  Among the key reasons 
that were consistently reported for not responding were a change in job responsibilities, survey 
length (more than 100 questions), and sensitivity to sharing information related to intelligence 
practices.  Examining the non-response bias was not possible and given there is no national data 
related to law enforcement intelligence for comparison, the results to follow should be 
interpreted with caution.    
The present study provides unique value due to a significant empirical gap in the 
knowledge base of ILP, especially at the national-level.  As a result this study serves as one of 
the few empirical explorations into the factors associated with the ILP philosophy.  Table 1 
displays descriptive information for the agencies and respondents represented in the current 
study.  The median agency size is 276 total sworn and non-sworn personnel and most agencies 
included in the sample were located in the Midwest region of the United States, followed closely 
by the Southeast and Northwest.  Respondents are mostly investigators and administrators who 
have been employed by their agency for more than 15 years.  
 
 
[ Table 1 approximately here ] 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures 
 Similar to community policing, appropriate dependent variables can vary based on 
implementation or practice as there is no specific operationalization of community policing or 
ILP.  Because implementation, especially nationwide, can be examined across varying 
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applications of the philosophy and unique agency characteristics, the present research will 
examine different dependent variables as indicators of implementation.  Also, a variety of 
independent variables is included to identify factors that may contribute to, or resist, program 
implementation.  Appendix A includes a list of each dependent and independent measure, how 
the item was presented on the survey, response options for the item, and measure construction 
information if applicable.  
 One of the difficulties associated with this research is parsing out the differences between 
dependent and explanatory variables.  This issue pertains to the use of intelligence-related 
explanatory variables to draw inferences regarding ILP dependent variables.  As the majority of 
police organizational change literature has utilized traditional measures of structure and 
complexity to explain the adoption of change (see Maguire, 1997; Maguire et al., 2003; 
Morabito, 2010), ILP requires a more nuanced set of variables to target specific practices.  As 
mentioned previously, ILP is viewed as a strategic modification to existing policing practices.  
Agencies do not “change” as much as they “tweak” what they are doing.  The emphasis is on the 
utilization of intelligence and the sharing of information.  Thus, targeted measures that represent 
specific functions within an agency are necessary to inform the desired outcome.   
For example, one of the common measures of organizational control (within the 
complexity construct to adopt change) is formalization – the extent to which agencies have 
formal policies.  If a general approach were taken, an agency may have a high-degree of 
formalization due to their written policies regarding use of force, domestic violence, vehicle 
pursuit, and so forth, but could be missing a specific policy that guide their intelligence function.  
Given the more-formal and civilly-sensitive nature of intelligence in law enforcement, this 
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absence of an intelligence-specific policy is noteworthy and should be captured – as opposed to a 
general scale of agency formalization.   
In an attempt to capture differences between factors believed to be dependent versus 
explanatory, exploratory factors analysis was employed to identify a latent construct associated 
with the dependent variables and independent variables to be described below.  These variables 
were identified primarily on theory and one of the author’s professional experiences training law 
enforcement on the practice of ILP.  Theoretically speaking, the dependent measures represent a 
general latent construct of an observable intelligence output from an organization while 
independent variables represent structures and process to create the observable output.  Factor 
analysis identified a single latent factor among the six dependent variables (eigenvalue of 3.35) 
as well as a single latent factor among the nine independent variables (eigenvalue of 4.83).  
When all fifteen variables are included in the factor analysis, two latent constructs are identified 
(eigenvalues of 2.38 and 1.52).  Though not definitive, this exploratory analysis lends support, 
outside theory and practice, that the dependent and independent factors utilized in this research 
are likely representative of different constructs.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 Six dependent variables were selected as measures of police agency behavior that would 
indicate a strong or “tight” association between ILP and the recommendations put forth in the 
NCISP.  First, a scaled variable was created to reflect the variation in analytic products created 
by an agency.  These intelligence products included Bulletins, Risk Assessments, Advisories, 
Alerts, Warnings, Executive Reports, and Briefings. This variable is representative of an analytic 
function within the agency as a combination of product types and frequency of creation.  
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Agencies that create a greater variation of intelligence products are reflective of engaging in ILP.  
Second, whether or not information sharing is explicitly rewarded in the agency through formal 
evaluation.  Agencies that reward information sharing demonstrate a commitment to this 
emerging philosophy.  Having this reward function integrated into the formal evaluation process 
signifies a formal commitment to ILP as opposed to an informal “lip service” that the agency 
feels information sharing is important.  Third, a scale was developed to represent the extent to 
which an agency has close working relationships with external organizations.  The nature of the 
relationships for this index is specifically for the purpose of sharing information.  Working with 
external organizations to share information is at the heart of ILP.  Fourth, the extent to which an 
agency provides intelligence to external agencies.  Related to this variable is the fifth measure, 
the extent to which an agency receives intelligence from external agencies.  This two-way 
information sharing is an activity measure of ILP inputs and outputs.   Lastly, intelligence is 
formally integrated into the agency’s decision making process.  This strategic use of intelligence 
is the operational key to ILP.   
 
Independent Variables 
 As mentioned at the onset of this research, institutional theory posits that agencies adopt 
occupational practices to obtain legitimacy and resources.  Dominant coalitions with regulatory 
authority prescribe templates to subordinate bodies, often in the form of manuals, reports, and 
training.  These written prescriptions are tools for agencies to follow, which illustrate their work 
process alignment in the occupational field.  As noted earlier, the NCISP developed by the U.S. 
Department of Justice is expected to provide a means of diffusing and aligning ILP methods and 
ideologies across local law enforcement agencies. This normative form of isomorphism guided 
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the selection process of independent variables for analysis.  Questions were selected based on 
either of the following contextual-components.   
First, at the core of institutional theory, and by extension loose coupling, is the idea of 
commitment to the organizational field. Words, such as “function” and “align” signal an 
agency’s commitment to field practices.  If a survey item had terminology that was aligned with 
institutional theory and loose coupling ideologies, it was included as an independent variable.  
For example: “Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the NCISP Recommendations?”  
Second, survey items that identified acronyms were used in the selection process.  These types of 
items tend to be a form of ritualized vocabulary to demarcate field identity.  Moreover, 
ceremonial practices, including adoption of terminology, denote agency engagement to 
prescribed functional practices within a field. For instance: “Does your agency align with the 
DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL)?”  As Stinchcombe (1997) might argue, the ritualized 
vocabulary (e.g. acronyms and institutional terminology) that become part of the ethos of an 
organization, signals to institutional actors and others important subject matters.  
 Additional independent variables focused on structural and process aspects of intelligence 
within agencies.  These variables were identified through organizational policing literature as 
well as one of the author’s professional experiences training law enforcement specifically within 
the area of intelligence.  Whether or not an agency has a specific policy in place to guide their 
intelligence function, had a process in place to share information with the public, required 
intelligence-specific training, focused on suspicious activity related to all-crimes (rather than just 
terrorism), the extent to which respondents believed their agency had sufficient staff for their 
intelligence capability, were consistent with federal privacy guidelines for sharing information, 
and also audited the intelligence records system were identified as critical components necessary 
21 
 
to implement ILP.  Agency size, as measured using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Police 
Employee Data, is included in the models as agency size is believed to influence the extent to 
which agencies engage in ILP.  For purposes of the analytic models, a natural log transformation 
of agency size was utilized given the skewed distribution of the size data.   
 As can be seen in Table 2, with respect to the dependent variables, agencies on average 
create approximately half (16.73) of the intelligence products on a regular basis while an average 
of 40 percent of agencies formally reward information sharing.  Responding agencies had, on 
average, rather close working relationships with external organizations specifically for 
information sharing.  Agencies indicated, on average, receiving intelligence (14.13) from 
external organizations slightly more frequently than they provide it (13.80).  On average, 
respondents agree that intelligence is integrated into the decision making process.  In regard to 
independent variables, based on the modal response category, agencies mostly follow the 
NCISP, somewhat align their intelligence capacity with the TCL, are currently developing an 
intelligence policy, and do not believe they have sufficient staff for their intelligence function.  
On average, 44 percent of agencies have a process for sharing information with the public, 75 
percent employ an all-crimes approach to suspicious activity reporting, and 51 percent are 
consistent with federal privacy guidelines.   
 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 The present research primarily utilizes negative binomial regression with incident rate 
ratio coefficients, or exponentiated beta, to explore the count dependent variables.  Odds ratios 
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are reported to ease interpretation of findings as opposed to drawing inferences from logged 
counts (i.e., it is difficult to translate a one-unit increase of intelligence practices).  Pearson Chi 
Square goodness-of-fit tests indicate the distribution of the count dependent variables differed 
significantly from a Poisson distribution, thus the decision to utilize negative binomial models.  
For the information sharing reward variable, which is dichotomous, logistic regression was 
employed with odds ratios reported and robust standard errors.  Given the exploratory nature of 
the research, bivariate and multicollinearity diagnostics were conducted and no concerns were 
identified.  Both tolerance and variance inflation factors were well within acceptable levels.  Due 
to space considerations, these results are not presented and can be provided by the authors upon 
request.   
 
Findings 
 To best present the findings, the six dependent measures can be grouped into two general 
categories.  First, findings pertaining to “Intelligence-Led Policing Behaviors” are presented in 
Table 3 and consist of the scale of analytic products created, if the agency formally integrates 
intelligence into the decision making process, and whether or not information sharing is formally 
rewarded in the agency.  Second, findings reflective of “Information Sharing Behaviors with 
External Agencies” are presented in Table 4 and include working relationships with external 
organizations specifically for sharing information, the frequency at which an agency provides 
intelligence to external organizations, and the extent to which agencies receive intelligence from 
external organizations.  The findings are insightful.   
 
Intelligence-Led Policing Behaviors 
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 Table 3 presents the findings related to ILP behaviors.  To begin with, the strongest 
predictor of these three ILP behaviors is the consistency to which agencies follow the 
recommendations put forth in the NCISP.  As agencies follow the NCISP recommendations 
more closely, they are almost five times more likely to create a variety of intelligence products 
(4.81) and formally reward information sharing (4.79) while being almost three times as likely to 
formally integrate intelligence into their decision making process (2.97).  This is a welcomed 
finding as it appears agencies are adhering to the recommendations within the NCISP – an 
indication of tight-coupling.  With respect to indicators of agencies that create a variety of 
intelligence products, closer alignment with the Department of Homeland Security’s Target 
Capabilities List (1.99) and consistent with privacy guidelines (2.01) double the likelihood of 
creating more products.  Agencies that specifically have an intelligence policy (2.51), as well as 
larger agencies (3.96), also have a greater likelihood of producing analytic products.  This latter 
finding is likely a function of variance in personnel and task scope commonly found within 
larger agencies (Maguire et al., 2003).  Surprisingly, it appears that agencies that believed they 
had sufficient staff for their intelligence function was not indicative of creating intelligence 
products.  This is perhaps due to the non-specific nature of the question and future research could 
consider soliciting information specific to intelligence analyst personnel.  
 
[ Table 3 approximately here ] 
 
 Agencies that formally integrate intelligence into their decision making process believed 
they had sufficient staff (2.89) for their intelligence function.  Agencies that required personnel 
to receive intelligence-specific training (2.23) were also more likely to utilize intelligence for 
decision making.  Of interest is that it appears having a formal intelligence policy is not an 
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indicator of formally integrating intelligence into decision making.  This is also true of agencies 
that formally reward information sharing.  It would seem that if an agency formally rewarded 
personnel for sharing information, via the personnel evaluation process, that agency would have 
a policy specific to intelligence to guide behaviors and outcomes of personnel.  This appears not 
to be the case and may be more reflective of an informal culture of information sharing as 
opposed to a systematic process to collect, analyze, and disseminate information.  More 
intuitively, intelligence training (2.97) and processes for sharing information with the public 
(2.70) were strong indicators of agencies that reward information sharing.  Agencies that 
perceived having a sufficient staff were also more likely to formally reward information sharing. 
   
Information Sharing Behaviors with External Agencies 
 Table 4 presents the findings from information sharing behaviors with external agencies.  
Similar to the previous group of models, agency information sharing behaviors are strongly 
driven by consistency with the NCISP recommendations.  The closer agencies followed the 
NCISP, they were almost three times more likely to have closer relationships with external 
agencies (2.91), four times more likely to provide intelligence to external agencies (4.61), and 
over five times more likely to receive intelligence from external agencies (5.39).  However, it 
appears the strongest indicator of these three behaviors is agency size.  Larger agencies 
demonstrate an increased likelihood of having more working relationships (2.90) and provide 
intelligence to more external agencies (3.05) more frequently.  This finding likely eludes to the 
greater range of personnel and tasks often associated with larger agencies and is consistent with 
previous research in multi-agency crime reduction partnerships (Rosenbaum, 2002) and 
terrorism preparedness (Randol, 2012).  Interestingly this finding does not hold true for larger 
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agencies receiving intelligence from external agencies.  This is likely due to the influence of 
fusion centers.  Agencies of all sizes receive intelligence products from fusion centers (Carter & 
Chermak, 2012), however, not all agencies have an intelligence production capability and those 
that do are typically larger in size.  Thus, despite differences in size (and personnel resources), 
there is likely no discernable difference between intelligence received across different agencies.   
 
[ Table 4 approximately here ] 
 
Agencies that more tightly coupled with the TCL are also more likely to have working 
relationships for intelligence (2.96) as well as provide (3.36) and receive (2.01) intelligence.  
This finding is expected given the focus of the TCL as an “all hazards” threat prevention, 
mitigation, and response framework.  Active communication and close relationships are critical 
for emergency management and often involve agencies beyond just law enforcement (i.e., fire, 
emergency medical, transportation, etc.).  Though the measurement here is limited to strictly law 
enforcement, agencies that align with the TCL are expected to have a wide range of 
relationships.   
The final predictor of external relationships for information sharing was the presence of 
processes to share information with the public (2.19).  With regard to providing intelligence to 
external organizations, requiring personnel to attend intelligence-specific training (2.04) and 
more frequently auditing the intelligence records system (3.08) are additional predictive factors.  
Within all of the models tested here, the frequent auditing of intelligence records is only a 
predictor of providing intelligence to other agencies.  This is a welcomed finding and perhaps 
speaks to the contemporary nature of law enforcement intelligence.  As time passed following 
the September 11th attacks, there has been a shift in concern among citizens from terrorism to the 
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possibility of civil rights violations on behalf of law enforcement being overzealous (Carter, 
2009).  Though this cannot be examined in the current research, in light of this context it seems 
reasonable to assume that agencies who regularly audit their intelligence records system (to 
purge information that violates 28 CFR Part 23 laws) are more willing to share their information 
as they have taken safeguards to ensure the information is lawful.    
 
Conclusion  
 This study examined implementation of intelligence-led policing within a loose coupling 
framework.  While the research into ILP is growing (i.e., Carter, 2014; Carter & Carter, 2009a, 
2009b; Carter & Phillips, 2013, Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; McGarrell et al., 2007; Ratcliffe, 
2008; Ratcliffe, & Guidetti, 2008; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012), there is an absence of scholarship 
providing science-based insights of how ILP operates within local police agencies as well as the 
factors associated with its implementation.  The findings reported here attempt to fill this void.  
Though the findings presented here are unique to the literature and provide insights about the 
adoption of intelligence-led policing, limitations exist.    
 The data used to measure both dependent and independent variables are the result of a 
self-response survey where a single individual responded on behalf of his/her agency.  While this 
is a limitation, it has been argued that this approach is necessary due to the complexities and 
dynamic nature of intelligence within law enforcement agencies and these persons are best 
positioned to respond to the survey.  The results presented should be accepted with caution, due 
to an inability to detect the nature of the response bias and since there is no national data related 
to intelligence for comparison.   
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 Despite this limitation, this research indicates that, as operationalized here, the 
superordinate and subordinate levels are fairly well connected.  Specifically, the NCISP, as 
articulated by the federal government, represents the superordinate or dominate coalition level 
that prescribes institutional practices.  The local law enforcement agencies represent the 
subordinate or work process group that is expected to subscribe to or implement the desired 
practices of the superordinate group.  The findings indicate that the ILP activities of local police 
agencies are fairly well-connected to the behavior they are expected to perform.  Adhering to the 
recommendations of the NCISP illustrates the greatest uniformity with the expected behaviors of 
creating analytic products, integrating intelligence into the decision making process, and the 
rewarding of information sharing.  These findings are consistent with Ratcliff’s (2008) assertion 
that ILP calls for an adjustment in organizational functions; that strategic and tactical decisions 
should be related to a formal analytic process.  In addition, closely following the NCISP was 
significantly related to all the information sharing behaviors.   
Aspects of field identity, such as acronyms and terminology, also appear related to tight 
coupling between the behavior that is expected from the dominate coalition and the behavior that 
is actually performed by the work process group.  For example, the use of Department of 
Homeland Security’s Target Capabilities Lists (TCL), while vague in actual guidance for police 
agencies, is related to the creation of analytic products and all forms of information sharing.  It 
may be that, despite the ambiguity of the TCL, they demonstrate police engagement with ILP; 
they may have become part of the organizational ethos of police departments, and therefore, 
important for the agencies to utilize.  
 The influence of agency size and its relationship to the outcomes measures merits special 
attention for the current research as well as for the guidance of future research.  First, it seems to 
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be no surprise that size is related to the creation of analytic products.  This may be a simple issue 
of resources: larger agencies may have a budget that allows greater access to computer and 
information technology (i.e., records systems and data mining subscriptions) that assist with 
more sophisticated analyses.  Further, larger agencies likely have residual personnel, and 
assigning a specialized analyst to a unique role may be an easy task.  Second, the fact that agency 
size is not related to decision making is an important finding, suggesting two possible behaviors: 
All police agencies, regardless of size, use their analytic products as part of their decision 
making, or police agencies in general do not connect analysis with decision making.  Future 
research will have to untangle this result with more detailed measures that link decision making 
with ILP products.  Larger agencies, however, were significantly associated with working 
relationships and providing intelligence to external agencies.  It seems reasonable to assert that 
larger agencies are likely surrounded by other “suburban” agencies in a “cosmopolitan network” 
(Skogan and Hartnett, 2005 p. 402).  Thus, larger police agencies may already have a working 
relationship with a number of surrounding police agencies. 
Considerations for future research should include an exploration of appropriate ILP 
models across varying agency sizes and community compositions.  Aside from aforementioned 
size-related factors, research on homeland security preparedness among local law enforcement 
has indicated agency size is perhaps not as salient as an agency’s geographic proximity to a 
major urban area (Schafer et al., 2009); the same is likely true for ILP.  A comprehensive metric 
of ILP is needed.  Similar to community policing research, scholars should consider developing a 
scaled index item of intelligence practices.  This is made difficult given significant fidelity across 
agencies and even among scholars.  It is believed the present research is a step in this direction 
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despite the dependent and independent variables not being originally constructed for purposes of 
evaluating ILP adoption.    
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Respondent Demographics (n = 272)  
 N (Valid Percent) 
Agency Size 
          10 or Less 
          11 - 99  
          100 or more 
 
35 (13%) 
84 (31%) 
153 (56%) 
Agency Region 
          Northeast 
          Southeast 
          Midwest 
          Southwest 
          West 
 
60 (22%) 
62 (23%) 
73 (27%) 
30 (11%) 
47 (17%) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
 
82 (30%) 
62 (23%) 
87 (32%) 
41 (15%) 
Respondent Years at Agency 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
 
1 (0.3%) 
16 (6%) 
49 (18%) 
57 (21%) 
149 (55%) 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (n = 272) 
Variable Min Max Mean S.D. 
Dependent     
Analytic Products Scale 7 35 16.73 7.12 
Information Sharing Rewarded 0 1 0.40 0.49 
Relationships Scale 6 24 18.41 3.57 
Provide Intelligence Scale 6 24 13.80 4.81 
Receive Intelligence Scale 6 24 14.13 4.48 
Intelligence Integrated Decision Making 1 4 2.65 0.83 
 
Independent      
Follows NCISP 1 4 2.40 0.86 
Align with TCL 1 4 2.11 0.93 
Intelligence Policy 0 2 1.09 0.88 
Information Sharing with Public 0 1 0.44 0.50 
Sufficient Staff 1 4 2.09 0.78 
All Crimes SARs 0 1 0.75 0.43 
Federal Privacy Consistent 0 1 0.51 0.50 
Audit Intelligence Records 1 4 2.36 1.26 
Intelligence Training Required 0 1 0.21 0.41 
Agency Size* 5 50,688 1,322 3,720 
Agency Size (ln) 0.69 10.83 5.75 1.83 
*The inclusion of the six largest U.S. municipal police agencies greatly skews the descriptive measures of agency 
size. The median agency size in the sample is 276.  
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Table 3. Intelligence-Led Policing Behaviors Regressed on Agency Intelligence Characteristics (n = 272) 
Variable 
Analytic Products Created Integrated Decision Making Information Sharing Rewarded 
Exp(B) S.E. t Exp(B) S.E. t O.R. S.E. t 
Follows NCISP 1.004 0.001 4.81*** 1.004 0.001 2.97** 1.050 0.011 4.79*** 
Align with TCL 1.066 0.034 1.99* 1.016 0.019 0.83 1.053 0.210 0.26 
Intelligence Policy 1.118 0.500 2.51* 1.042 0.030 1.42 1.378 0.490 0.90 
Information Sharing with Public 1.068 0.071 0.99 1.052 0.039 1.39 2.679 0.978 2.70** 
Sufficient Staff 1.073 0.039 1.96 1.081 0.029 2.89** 2.017 0.618 2.29* 
All Crimes SARs 0.991 0.064 -0.15 1.035 0.038 0.94 0.881 0.385 -0.29 
Federal Privacy Consistent 1.189 0.101 2.01* 1.065 0.051 1.31 0.755 0.404 -0.53 
Audit Intelligence Records 0.992 0.033 -0.22 0.996 0.024 -0.16 0.670 0.133 -1.89 
Intelligence Training Required 1.111 0.061 1.91 1.084 0.039 2.23* 3.274 1.308 2.97** 
Agency Size (ln) 1.062 0.016 3.96*** 1.010 0.010 0.95 .824 0.108 -1.48 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Table 4. Information Sharing Behaviors with External Agencies Regressed on Agency Intelligence Characteristics (n = 272)  
Variable 
Relationships Provide Intelligence Receive Intelligence 
Exp(B) S.E. t Exp(B) S.E. t Exp(B) S.E. t 
Follows NCISP 1.003 0.000 2.91** 1.004 0.001 4.61*** 1.005 0.001 5.39*** 
Align with TCL 1.036 0.012 2.96** 1.081 0.025 3.36*** 1.061 0.031 2.01* 
Intelligence Policy 1.030 0.022 1.33 1.104 0.052 2.10* 1.071 0.059 1.23 
Information Sharing with Public 1.052 0.024 2.19* 1.015 0.052 0.28 0.994 0.056 -0.10 
Sufficient Staff 0.989 0.013 -0.80 0.987 0.029 -0.44 0.970 0.026 -1.13 
All Crimes SARs 0.988 0.023 -0.52 0.985 0.051 -0.29 1.032 0.055 0.59 
Federal Privacy Consistent 0.992 0.028 -0.27 0.924 0.058 -1.27 0.909 0.055 -1.58 
Audit Intelligence Records 1.015 0.011 1.35 1.075 0.025 3.08** 1.060 0.032 1.90 
Intelligence Training Required 1.004 0.022 0.19 1.095 0.049 2.04* 1.071 0.057 1.28 
Agency Size (ln) 1.021 0.001 2.90** 1.037 0.012 3.05** 1.032 0.017 1.87 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Appendix A 
 
Survey Items for Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Intelligence Products Scale 
Item: “How frequently does your agency create the following intelligence products?”  
 Bulletins 
Risk Assessments 
Advisories 
Alerts 
Warnings 
Executive Reports 
Briefings 
Response options: “Never”, “Once or Twice a Year”, “Monthly”, “Weekly”, “Daily”  
Alpha = .908 
Factors analysis eigenvalue = 4.563 
 
 
Information Sharing Rewarded 
Item: “Information sharing is explicitly rewarded in our organization (e.g. by formal 
evaluation)” 
Response options: “Yes”, “No” 
 
 
Relationships Scale 
Item: “How close is the working relationship between your organization and the 
following agencies?” 
FBI 
Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 
State Law Enforcement Agencies 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Your State Fusion Center 
Other State Fusion Center 
Response options: “Very Close”, “Somewhat Close”, “Distant”, “We Have No 
Relationship” 
Alpha = .781 
Factors analysis eigenvalue = 2.935 
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Provide Intelligence Scale 
 Item: “How often do your provide actionable intelligence to the following agencies?” 
  FBI 
  Other Law Enforcement 
State Law Enforcement 
Local Law Enforcement 
State Fusion Center 
Other State Fusion Center 
Response options: “Very Frequently”, “Frequently”, “Infrequently”, “Very Infrequently” 
Alpha = .895 
Factors analysis eigenvalue = 3.966 
 
 
Receive Intelligence Scale 
Item: “How often do you receive actionable intelligence from the following agencies?” 
  FBI 
  Other Law Enforcement 
State Law Enforcement 
Local Law Enforcement 
State Fusion Center 
Other State Fusion Center 
Sheriffs 
Response options: “Very Frequently”, “Frequently”, “Infrequently”, “Very Infrequently” 
Alpha = .808 
Factors analysis eigenvalue = 3.137 
 
 
Intelligence Integrated Decision Making 
Item: “How often is intelligence formally integrated into your agency’s decision-making 
process” 
 Response options: “All the Time”, “Sometimes”, “Occasionally”, “Never” 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Follows NCISP 
Item: “Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the NCISP recommendations?” 
Response options: “Completely”, “Mostly”, “Some”, “Not at All” 
 
 
Align with TCL 
Item: “Does your agency’s intelligence function align with the Department of Homeland 
Security Target Capabilities List?” 
Response options: “Completely”, “Mostly”, “Some”, “Not at All” 
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Intelligence Policy 
 Item: “Do you have a policy designed expressly to guide your intelligence function?” 
 Response options: “Yes”, “Currently in Development”, “No” 
  
 
Information Sharing with Public 
Item: “Our agency has processes in place for sharing relevant terrorism information with 
the public” 
Response options: “Yes, “No” 
 
 
Sufficient Staff 
Item: “We have a sufficient number of staff to achieve our agency’s intelligence capacity 
mission” 
 Response options: “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree”, Strongly Disagree” 
 
 
All Crimes SARs 
Item: “Are your Suspicious Activity Reports for all crimes?” 
Response options: “Yes, “No” 
 
 
Federal Privacy Consistent 
Item: “Does your privacy policy meet the federal privacy policy standards?” 
Response options: “Yes, “No” 
 
 
Audit Intelligence Records 
 Item: “Do you audit your intelligence function and records?” 
 Response options: “Yes, Regularly”, “Yes, Occasionally”, “Yes, As Needed”, “No” 
 
 
Intelligence Training Required 
Item: “All personnel responsible for the intelligence function in the agency are required 
to receive specific training on ILP” 
Response options: “Yes, “No” 
 
 
Agency Size 
Data was taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report Police 
Employee Data. Agency size is the sum of sworn and non-sworn personnel.   
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